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 This article undertakes a critical analysis of subjectivity and exposes the 
metaphysical and anthropocentric quasi-transcendental conditions that 
give rise to the construct(ion) of the Subject. I locate a critical moment 
for the metaphysical Subject in the work of Martin Heidegger which, 
whilst sadly not sustained in his later writings, provides a point of 
departure for an examination of the significance that animality plays in 
the metaphysical tradition and its constitutive relation to the construct of 
subjectivity. I discern this relation to be violent and sacrificial and draw 
on Jacques Derrida's nonanthropocentric ethics against the background 
of Drucilla Cornell's ethical reading of deconstruction to construct a 
critique of approaches that assimilate animals to the traditional model of 
subjectivity in order to represent their identity and interests in the legal 
paradigm. The main argument that I seek to advance is that such an 
approach paradoxically re-constructs the classical humanist subject of 
metaphysics and re-establishes the subject-centred system that silences 
the call of the animal Other, thereby solidifying and extending the 
legitimacy of a discourse and mode of social regulation that is 
fundamentally anthropocentric. I examine how we can address, 
incapacitate and move beyond this schemata of power through a 
rigorous deconstruction of the partitions that institute the Subject and 
how deconstruction clears a space for a de novo determination of the 
animal "subject" that can proceed from different sites of 
nonanthropocentric interruption. What follows is a call to refuse the 
mechanical utilisation of traditional legal constructs and I argue in favour 
of an approach to the question of the animal (in law) that identifies and 
challenges anthropocentrism as its critical target. I ultimately propose a 
critical engagement with the underlying metaphysical support of animal 
rights at a conceptual level, rather than simply utilising the law 
pragmatically as an instrument of immediate resolution. 
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Animal liberation theorists' engagement with the law has largely been a 
depthless and uncritical one. Relying on scientific accounts of animals to 
uncover and support claims about their moral standing and legal subjectivity, 
scholars have been turning to existing legal constructs and frameworks in an 
attempt to bring animals into the realm of legal consideration and protection. 
Rather than questioning the way in which the law (in its most general sense) 
continues to exercise anthropocentric power and silence the call of the animal 
Other, animal rights discourse labours under the unexamined supposition 
that existing legal constructs provide a suitable framework within which to 
effect changes in our thinking and relation with animals. There has, rather 
paradoxically, been little sustained engagement with the philosophico-
juridical register of animal rights and a larger jurisprudential positioning of the 
animal in law and right(s). Whilst a plethora of moral and ethical philosophies 
on animal rights provides refined arguments in favour of the expansion or 
reformation of humanist liberatory discourse to ground the animal's moral and 
ethical agency, there has been a glaring neglect of engagement with the 
complexity of the subject, the being whose interests are to be protected 
through right(s). In short, the animal subject has been neglected in 
jurisprudence.  
Whilst I am aware that there are multiple theoretical-philosophical 
approaches to animal rights theory and consequently don't wish to claim the 
existence of a single model, there are indeed recurring structural tenets that 
undergird the salient current models.2 Most notably for the purpose of my 
focus in this article, they all ultimately revert to a subject-centred model that 
functions at the junctures of highly problematic homogenising categorisations 
(human / animal, subject / object, owner / property, rational / irrational) that 
validate and sustain the anthropocentric and carno-phallogocentric 
                                            
* Jan-Harm de Villiers. BCom (Law) (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM (Jurisprudence) 
(cum laude) (UP). Senior Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence, University of South 
Africa. E-mail: dvillj@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Poem by Friedrich Rolf Huber quoted in Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 142. 
2  See Regan Case for Animal Rights; Regan Defending Animal Rights; Wise Drawing 
the Line; Francione Animals as Persons. 
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metaphysical structure from which the very notion of subjectivity not only 
emanates, but upon which it is reliant.  
The main purpose of this article is to (re)turn the discourse of animal rights to 
its dependency on the event of subjectivity through a modest and focussed 
engagement with the most fundamental pre-condition of rights: the question 
of the Subject. What follows is a call to refuse the mechanical utilisation of 
traditional legal constructs and to argue in favour of an approach to the 
question of the animal (in law) that identifies and challenges 
anthropocentrism as its critical target. It is a call to engage with the underlying 
metaphysical support of animal rights at a conceptual level, rather than simply 
to utilise the law pragmatically as an instrument of immediate resolution. I am 
thus reiterating a previous call for a critical approach of slowness.3 Animal 
rights theorists' eagerness to simply add animals into existing legal 
frameworks in the hope of effecting immediate change is understandable, 
given the almost unimaginable suffering that millions of animals endure every 
day. My project, however, stems from the premise that animal liberation will, 
unfortunately, inevitably be a slow and gradual process. Any approach that 
fails to take on the laborious, time-consuming task of confronting 
metaphysical anthropocentrism will foreclose the possibility of destabilising 
and moving beyond the very interpretation of the human (as subject) that lies 
at the heart of animal subjugation.  
This article can roughly be divided into two parts, and unfolds as follows: In 
the first part I undertake a critical philosophical analysis of the subjectivity that 
undergirds rights, specifically focussing on the metaphysics of subjectivity 
and presence. I argue that the construct of subjectivity inevitably requires that 
the animal be assimilated to the prototypical and ground symbolic of the 
(hu)man of rights, ultimately reinforcing the containment of the animal in an 
identification as sub-human Other. In the second part of the article I examine 
how deconstruction clears a space for a re-conceptualisation of the animal 
"subject" in terms of subjection, substitution, hostage, and ultimately 
responsibility. I draw on Derrida's deconstructive gestures against the 
background of a previous engagement with Cornell's reconceptualisation of 
deconstruction to illustrate that deconstruction exposes a limit, in turn 
preserving the possibility of another thought of relation and ultimately another 
law. As such, I regard a deconstructive approach as vital to unweaving the 
anthropocentrism woven into the fabric of legal constructs and holding open 
the possibility of a post-subjective space that is non-anthropocentric. 
                                            
3  See De Villiers 2015 SAPL. 
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2 The anthropomorphic hegemony of subjectivity 
Animal rights theorists effectively seek a displacement of the line that 
separates the (legal) subject from the (legal) object so that animals can be 
endowed with the substratum of (legal) subjectivity from which rights and 
correlative legal protection flow. Legal rights are internally linked with the 
metaphysics of subjectivity in its chronological conception and 
complementarity; rights are the legal validation of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity.4 Metaphysics – meta (over or beyond) ta physica (the physical 
material world) – is the study of that which lies beyond the immediate physical 
realm. Metaphysics aims to describe and make sense of the disorder that 
unknowables (like existence and possibility) confront us with, and to master 
finitude, which, as Heidegger5 remarks, "is not some property that is merely 
attached to us, but is our fundamental way of being". 
We find the foundation of metaphysics in the classical Greek philosophers' 
reversal between the sensible and the intelligible, reaching its completion in 
Plato; the phenomenal world reflected as shadows against the dim wall of the 
cave and true reality existing in the sunlit world of ideas and forms. Beyond 
chaotic nature, which abounds with phenomena and appearances, lies the 
truth, which can be approached through philosophical dispositions of reason 
or logos.6 For Heidegger,7 the origin of metaphysics overlaps with the 
establishment of a certain humanism in which the human "move[s] into a 
central place among beings". Here human beings are defined, within a 
metaphysically established system of beings, as animal rationale and lead 
"to the liberation of their possibilities, to the certitude of their destiny, and to 
the securing of their 'life'".8  
Heidegger9 finds in Plato's thinking "a change that becomes the history of 
metaphysics". For Heidegger, Plato relinquishes the essence of 
"unhiddenness" and initiates a shift in the essence of truth. No longer is truth 
understood as the unhiddenness or unconcealment of beings themselves, 
but unhiddenness becomes "harnessed in a relation to looking, 
apprehending, thinking, and asserting".10 Truth is sequentially re-located in 
the correct narration and depiction of "objects" by the human "subject". If this 
understanding of truth finds its genesis in Plato, we see it reach its grand 
                                            
4  Douzinas End of Human Rights 241. 
5  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 6. 
6  Douzinas End of Human Rights 202. 
7  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 181.  
8  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 181. 
9  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 181. 
10  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 182. 
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finale in Decartes' search for a fundamentum absolutum inconcussum 
veritatis - an absolute, unshakeable foundation of truth - which he locates in 
the self-present human subject.11  
The word subject stems from the Latin subjectum, literally meaning "that 
which is thrown under". The subject thus designates a fundamental stratum 
for the affirmation of qualities, predicates and attributes. The Latin subjectum 
was translated from the Greek hupokeimenon, "that which lies under", a term 
that Aristotle used to refer to "that of which all other entities are predicated 
but which is itself not predicated of anything else".12 Hupokeimenon ascribes 
a foundation upon which all entities become intelligible, and a determination 
of the subject as hupokeimenon is a claim to the meaning of Being – defined 
as the foundation upon which entities are grasped as such. Heidegger 
pointed out that every conceptualisation of the subject, irrespective of its 
affirming substantialisation, continuously postulates an ultimum subjectum or 
absolute foundation, rendering any determination of subjectivity 
fundamentally metaphysical.13 Decartes' cogito ergo sum placed this 
foundation on humanity and, according to Heidegger, decisively turned 
classical metaphysics into anthropology by identifying the subjectum with the 
human subject, the final point of reference and ultimate ground of all that 
exists.14 Nietzsche punctuated and solidified the infection of rationality. For 
Heidegger, Nietzsche's inversing figuration of the human as animal rationale 
simply reinforces the metaphysical framework within which human 
subjectivity is constructed. Rather than moving beyond a metaphysical 
determination of the subject, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's thought 
remains grounded in a subjectivist understanding of values and his re-
prioritisation of man's animality (over rationality) merely signals an inversion 
of the classical metaphysical definition and, with that, the closure of the 
metaphysical tradition's potentiality.15 At this closure, where "the Being of 
being human is exclusively presented in terms of the conscious subject, who 
sets the world forth and understands it through reduction of being to (self)-
representation", we find the human as the relational centre of all that is.16  
Heidegger understood that metaphysics has ab initio been concerned with 
one guiding question, namely what is an entity (in its Being)? Critchley17 notes 
                                            
11  Calarco 2004 Cont Philos Rev 178. 
12  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 51. 
13  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 52. 
14  Douzinas End of Human Rights 204. 
15  Calarco Zoographies 32. 
16  Douzinas End of Human Rights 205. 
17  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 52. 
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that metaphysics is not a regional ontology that asks after the Being of a 
region of entities like living things (biology) or physical matter (physics), but 
rather concerns itself with the question of the Being of an entity as such. The 
question of Being (or Seinsfrage) is thus the guiding question of philosophy 
for Heidegger and the philosophical tradition stretching from Plato to 
Nietzsche involves the unfolding of theses on the meaning of Being that 
progressively obfuscate its original sending.18 Metaphysics has thus always 
been a metaphysics of the subject to the extent that philosophy has always 
sought to designate the subjectum, the ultimate foundation from which 
entities become intelligible. In this sense, all the master words of pre-modern 
metaphysics (eidos, ousia, causa sui) are subjects and the subject is also 
always the subject of metaphysics.19 
For Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition is guilty of a forgetfulness or 
oblivion of Being. This forgetfulness is embodied in a failure to ask the 
question of Being (in itself) and a synchronal development and determination 
of a concept of subjectivity. As explained above, the history of philosophy can 
be seen as a meditation on the subjectum as foundation for an understanding 
of entities and what is at stake in this tradition, for Heidegger, is a 
displacement of this metaphysical foundation. No longer residing in a form, 
substance or deity, the foundation is ultimately found in the human 
understood as subject.20 He writes: 
The Meditationes de prima philosophia provide the pattern for the ontology of 
the subiectum constructed from the perspective of a subjectivity defined as 
conscientia. Man has become the subiectum. He can, therefore, determine and 
realize the essence of subjectivity – always according to how he conceives and 
wills himself.21 
Heidegger ultimately forces us to reflect on the significance of the 
metaphysical baggage accompanying the unfolding conceptualisation and 
concluding identification of man as subject. I would like to further 
problematise this schema by approaching it from an interdependent, but 
differentiated vantage point, shifting the focus from the implications of the 
human becoming subject, to the significance of the human becoming subject. 
Recalling Critchley's assertion that metaphysics is concerned with the 
question of the Being of an entity as such, to what extent, if at all, is the 
metaphysical tradition concerned with the particular question of the animal's 
                                            
18  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 52. 
19  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 53. 
20  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 53. 
21  Heidegger "Age of the World Picture" 84. 
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Being? What significance does animality play in the metaphysical tradition 
and in what relation does it stand to the construct of subjectivity?  
By recognising that human(ity) was consistently juxtaposed to animal(ity) 
throughout the development of Western metaphysics - from Plato's22 view of 
humans as creatures "different and more divine, pastur[ing] other kinds of 
living creatures more lowly than themselves", to Aristotle's23 acquiescent 
sentiment that animals are inferior beings that "should be under subjection to 
man…" and Decartes'24 well-known account of animals as automata or 
"machine[s] made by the hands of God" - we can begin to reflect on the 
anthropomorphic hegemony of subjectivity and its implications for discourses 
and institutions that evoke this construct. My aim is to illustrate that the 
construct(ion) of subjectivity is a violent, exclusionary process of othering. It 
is important to note that not only animals occupy a space of marginalisation 
within the metaphysical tradition, as classical concepts of subjectivity have 
excluded a plethora of Others. The earlier citation from Aristotle that I 
suspended with an ellipse highlights another dimension to the conjunctive 
sacrificial structure of the metaphysical tradition:  
… so is it naturally with the male and the female, the one is superior, the other 
inferior; the one governs, the other is governed… Those men therefore who are 
as much inferior to others as the body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, 
as the proper use of them is their bodies, in which their excellence consists.25 
Aristotle's justification for the appropriation and ingestion of the juxtaposed 
Other's body has profound significance for the structure of subjectivity, and I 
will return to this argument below. The point that I am trying to make here, 
which is not unrelated to the main argument being developed, is that the 
subject has been constituted through various relations of hierarchy, each 
reflecting a particular form of power. Any challenge to these hegemonic 
constructs requires a radical re-thinking of the subject so as to avoid the 
paradox of challenging a form of power whilst accepting its own terms of 
reference. I am in particular concerned with anthropocentrism as a guiding 
thread of the metaphysical tradition and its implications for an attempt to 
assimilate animals to the existing model of legal subjectivity. If, as Heidegger 
has extensively argued, the metaphysical tradition has failed to adequately 
attend to the question of Being and the essence of the human is lost in the 
process of man’s being conceived of as subject, what would the implications 
                                            
22  Plato "Statesman" 313. 
23  Aristotle "Treatise on Government" 17.  
24  Descartes "Discourse" 44. 
25  Aristotle "Treatise on Government" 17. 
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be if the philosophical and legal concept of subjectivity were applied to other 
animals?  
Heidegger's writings, specifically his early work, reflect a certain appreciation 
and consideration of the salience of metaphysical anthropocentrism. Despite 
his failure to sustain his early challenge to ontotheological anthropocentrism, 
Heidegger's reflections on the being of animal life nevertheless mark an 
important critical moment for the metaphysical subject, and the lines of inquiry 
opened up by his work provide a suitable point of departure for an 
engagement with the pervasiveness of metaphysical anthropocentrism.  
3 Heidegger and metaphysical anthropocentrism 
Heidegger's26 first seminal work, published in 1927, provides no more than 
brief fragmented references to the animal. Yet the question of animal Being, 
though neither pursued nor explicitly contextualised, lingers as a faceless 
subtext. Heidegger27 calls for a reciprocal relationship between philosophy 
and the positive sciences, arguing that an ontological foundation can assist 
science by "leap[ing] ahead into some area of Being, disclos[ing] it for the first 
time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the structures 
within it, mak[ing] these available to the positive sciences as transparent 
assignments for their inquiry". With this, Heidegger acknowledges the need 
for projects that determine Being beyond Dasein. Later in this text 
Heidegger28 articulates a concern with beings as a whole and calls for a 
project on life, which would logically once again include other animals, as "a 
kind of Being in its own right". However, he immediately qualifies and 
positions the project of developing such an ontology of life as accessible only 
in Dasein and as a site of lack to be interpreted against the absence of 
qualities that differentiate Dasein's distinct Being. Heidegger insists on a 
privative interpretation and rejects an ontological definition of Dasein as 
"life… plus something else".29 This ground for analysis exposes more than a 
delineation of the entry point or scope of Heidegger's project at that specific 
time; it divulges a subtle yet pervasive anthropocentrism that would guide all 
his future writings, often in dissonance with his explicit opposition to certain 
anthropocentric leitmotifs of the metaphysical tradition that shape and 
legitimise the humanism that he finds so problematic.  
                                            
26  Heidegger Being and Time.  
27  Heidegger Being and Time 30-31. 
28  Heidegger Being and Time 75. 
29  Heidegger Being and Time 75. 
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The essence of the animal and her specific manner of being enjoy 
significantly more attention in his lecture course30 delivered shortly thereafter 
in 1929, and whilst the question of the human/animal distinction is addressed 
(to varying degrees) in several of his writings,31 Heidegger's most sustained 
engagement with an ontology of animal life is to be found in this text. Here 
his thesis on the reciprocity between philosophy and science is once again 
emphasised, complicated and refined, inter alia through an engagement with 
the relationship between Zoology and the philosophical project of determining 
the animal's essence. His interpretation, Heidegger holds, is valid for the 
relationship between philosophy and all the sciences and it elucidates an 
association of communal cooperation and reciprocal enlightening. 
Heidegger32 calls the relation between metaphysics and the positive sciences 
"an ambiguous one" and I read this characterisation as a problematisation of 
the tendency in both philosophy and the sciences to claim absolute autonomy 
over certain processes and objects of inquiry, a tendency that renders both 
isolated disciplines wanting. Addressing "the magnitude of difficulties 
surrounding a metaphysical interpretation of life" requires a twofold discursive 
shift: a repositioning of philosophy seen as a purely transcendental discourse 
capable of determining the essence of an entity without recourse to biological 
science and, concomitantly, of science seen as a positivistic uncovering of 
"facts" without any need for interpretation or ontology. It is through an 
engagement with the phenomenon of "world" that Heidegger aims to initiate 
this reciprocal relation and distinguish human Dasein from other animals by 
exposing their respective modes of Being.33  
3.1 Heidegger and the question of world 
Heidegger's engagement with the question of world starts with the 
supposition that humans are not merely part of the world, but moreover have 
world. But what about other beings that are also part of the world, like the 
animal, plant and stone? Heidegger34 proposes that certain distinctions 
immediately manifest themselves, "however crudely", upon undertaking a 
comparative examination:  
                                            
30  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. 
31  See inter alia Heidegger Being and Time; Heidegger What is Called Thinking?; 
Heidegger On the Way to Language; Heidegger "Origin of the Work of Art"; Heidegger 
Parmenides; Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'".  
32  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 188. 
33  Lewis 2017 Cosmos and History 52-53. 
34  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 177.  
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[1.] The stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] 
man is world-forming. 
In explaining his thesis that the animal is poor in world whilst man is world-
forming, Heidegger35 insists that this comparison "allows no evaluative 
ranking" and that it is not founded in the questionable habitual assessment 
that man has a higher or greater completeness of experiences and 
accessibility than animals. For Heidegger, anthropocentric hierarchical 
evaluations of essence and capacities are not only problematic in their denial 
of the complexities of animal relations (considering, for example, how the 
falcon's sense of sight and the canine's sense of smell surpass that of the 
human), such evaluations furthermore preclude an appreciation of the 
specificity of animals' world relations with other beings and are grounded in 
the very problematic premise that we can indeed compare human and animal 
world relations through the variegation of collective (dis)similarities. 
It is in Heidegger's commitment to a thinking of animality on the animals' own 
terms that we find his most progressive digression from the metaphysical 
tradition that he extensively critiqued. Heidegger's36 assertion that the 
determination of the animal's world relations "cannot be decided by 
reflections on language but only by taking a look at animality itself" signals a 
radical withdrawal from the anthropocentric prism through which the animal 
has traditionally been approached in Western philosophy. It is, however, also 
at this very juncture of trying to distinguish between the human and animal 
relation to world that Heidegger reasserts some of the most dogmatic and 
problematic tenets of traditional metaphysical discourse.37 
It needs to be noted that Heidegger's entire engagement with animality is 
aimed at articulating the unique relational structure of human Dasein and that 
his analysis of the animal's world-lessness serves to demarcate, through 
contrast and comparison, the essence of man's world-forming capacity.38 
"World" here designates for Heidegger a relational realm in which entities or 
beings are reciprocally present and accessible. The stone has no world; it 
does not "touch" the earth in any proper sense but merely "crops up" 
wherever it falls, having no relational force or access to the world in which it 
finds itself.39 The animal, by contrast, does have a relational structure and 
access of some kind. The lizard basking in the sun has not just cropped up 
in the world. When removed from the rock on which she is lying, the lizard 
                                            
35  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 194. 
36  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 195, own emphasis. 
37  Calarco Zoographies 22-23. 
38  Calarco "Heidegger's Zoontology" 20.  
39  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 197. 
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will start looking for her stone again, as she is accustomed to doing. The 
crucial point of differentiation, however, is that the lizard has no mode of being 
that allows her to penetrate the Being of an entity; to relate to the rock as a 
rock, or the sun as the sun. It is the lack of this relational "as" structure that, 
for Heidegger,40 renders the animal poor in world and precludes a capacity 
for ek-sisting:  
The manifestness of beings as such, of beings as beings, belongs to world. This 
implies that bound up with world is the enigmatic 'as,' beings as such, or 
formulated in a formal way: 'something as something,' a possibility which is quite 
fundamentally closed to the animal. 
For Heidegger,41 Ek-sistenz is thus inextricably linked to the dis-closive 
aptitude of Dasein; his specific way of relating to himself, others, and "mere 
possibility as Idea". Heidegger42 denotes (such) ek-sistence as "standing in 
the clearing of being", adding "this way of being is proper only to the human 
being". Heidegger's conceptualisation of "world" thus ultimately assumes (or 
perhaps rather subsumes) the ability to ek-sist.43 It is pertinent to reflect on 
the relevance of Heidegger's insistence that only man ek-sists, for it is a point 
that he repeatedly accentuates. Whilst it is clear that Heidegger is advancing 
the thesis that the metaphysical tradition has always been forgetful of Being 
and ignored what he deems to be man's essence, Heidegger is also 
solidifying a disconnection between animalitas and humanitas. Here it is 
important to recall Heidegger's rigorous critique of Nietzsche's thinking as the 
fulfilment and closure of the Western metaphysical tradition.  
I share the view that Heidegger not only fails to see the critical promise of 
Nietzsche's ontology, but that his critique furthermore exposes the very blind 
spot in his own thinking that encloses his project within the confines of 
metaphysical thought.44 Heidegger's critique is articulated against his view of 
the history and culmination of metaphysics as the subjectivisation of Being. 
What Heidegger failed to account for, however, is that the history of modern 
metaphysics is the progressive subjectivisation of (the) human-Being. For all 
                                            
40  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 274. 
41  Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'" 249. 
42  Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'" 247. 
43  This conceptualisation entrenches the essential gulf or "abyss" that, for Heidegger, 
separates humans and animals. He states "in any case living creatures are as they 
are without standing outside their being as such and within the truth of being, 
preserving in such standing the essential nature of their being. Of all the beings that 
are, presumably the most difficult to think about are living creatures, because on the 
one hand they are in a certain way most closely akin to us, and on the other they are 
at the same time separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss". Heidegger 
"Letter on 'Humanism'" 248. 
44  For an extensive explication of this position, see Calarco Zoographies 31-43. 
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Heidegger's efforts to uncover the essence of Dasein through a clear 
delineation and demarcation of the chasm that separates man from animal, 
it is the concretisation, implementation and perpetuation of this metaphysico-
anthropocentric axiomatic that frustrates and ultimately obstructs the 
possibility of moving beyond the metaphysics of subjectivity. Just as the 
tradition that preceded him, Heidegger's engagement with animals and 
animality serves to develop an understanding of the human's specificity and 
essence, and not as beings to be considered in their own right or on their own 
terms. This is not merely an inescapable modus that accompanies an inquiry 
that takes the human being as focal point; Heidegger is at pains to 
conceptualise man's separateness in opposition to the threat that the animal 
poses to that particularity.45 Heidegger's46 critique of the metaphysical 
humanism that "does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough" 
is thus deeply rooted in an essentialist logic of opposition between human 
and animal, and his project of displacing the metaphysical interpretation of 
man ultimately leaves us with a more rigorous delimitation of man that is 
grounded in highly problematic oppositions that remain inadequately 
questioned. Derrida's47 assertion that Heidegger's discourse "disrupt[s]… a 
certain traditional humanism" whilst ultimately remaining a "profound 
humanism" should be read from this perspective.  
4 Thinking at the limit of the subject 
If Heidegger's Dasein comes before the (dedomiciling of entities into object 
and) subject, who or what comes after the subject? In order to elucidate what 
is at stake in the contestation of this limit, I (re)turn to Nancy's interview with 
Derrida on the notion of subjectivity that I have previously engaged with.48 
Responding to Nancy's question "Who comes after the subject?" Derrida 
immediately delineates two concerns with Nancy's formulation. The first is 
intended as a response to prevailing criticisms or doxa on the "simple 
liquidation" of the subject and the second as a reproach to the unquestioned 
anthropocentrism that continues to emblematise the post-humanist tradition.  
Derrida firstly argues, contra popular neo-humanist notions, that the 
discourses of Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Freud, Marx and Nietzsche present 
a questioning, re-interpretation and re-positioning of the subject in its 
historico-cultural complexity. Far from "liquidating" the subject, the radically 
                                            
45  Calarco Zoographies 53. 
46  Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'" 251. 
47  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 113. 
48  De Villiers 2012 SAJHR.  
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decentered subject invites reflection on the consequences of such 
displacements for various institutions. The call for a "return to the subject" is 
thus confused in its misunderstanding of the constitution of the subject, as if 
there is indeed a Subject to return to. "There has never been The Subject for 
anyone", reminds Derrida.49 "The subject is a fable… but to concentrate on 
the elements of speech and conventional fiction that such a fable 
presupposes is not to stop taking it seriously (it is the serious itself)". 50 There 
is no authorial-authoritarian subject that is not confronted with a certain 
disruption or différance at its core. The condition of deconstruction is thus not 
an extraneous thematic that is being imposed on the thinkers of subjectivity, 
but a fundamental force at work in the authorial functions of the subject.51 
Once the subject has been "re-interpreted, displaced, decentered, re-
inscribed", the challenge for thought is firstly to work through the implications 
for institutions that presuppose the subjectum in its Cartesian and post-
Cartesian forms, and secondly to attend to the determination of the who or 
what responding to the question "who" (comes after the subject)?52 The latter 
point, against which Derrida raises his second apprehension, informs my 
central concern.  
Derrida is careful to keep a critical distance from post-humanist theorists who 
sustain and reproduce an unquestioned anthropocentrism. For Nancy,53 the 
"who" designates a locus post-subjectivity, "that place 'of the subject' that 
appears precisely through deconstruction itself" and he elaborates by asking, 
"What is the place that Dasein, for example, comes to occupy?" Derrida54 
remains highly sceptical of a simple overcoming of the metaphysical closure, 
warning that the substitution of "a very indeterminate 'who' for a 'subject' 
overburdened by metaphysical determinations" is not likely to result in a 
decisive displacement, and Heidegger's all too human Dasein remains, for 
Derrida, enclosed in the occlusion of metaphysical humanism and - 
anthropocentrism. Derrida55 is especially critical of the remnants of self-
presence implicit in Dasein's phenomenological (as such) relational mode 
and its function of radically and rigorously separating Dasein from other 
animals. The analytic of Dasein invokes conceptual oppositions that have not 
been adequately interrogated and the critical project of addressing and 
moving beyond the metaphysical problematic of the subject is located at the 
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borders of these oppositions. Here we find supposedly essential and 
exclusive qualities, attributes and phenomena that are fragile, surreptitious 
and volatile; and a deconstruction of these "propers" opens a space in which 
we can begin to re-determine and re-articulate the "who" (after the subject). 
To quote Derrida:56 
In order to recast, if not rigorously re-found a discourse on the 'subject,' on that 
which will hold the place (or replace the place) of the subject (of law, of morality, 
of politics…), one has to go through the experience of a deconstruction. This 
deconstruction (we should once again remind those who do not want to read) 
is neither negative nor nihilistic; it is not even a pious nihilism, as I have heard 
said. A concept (that is to say also an experience) of responsibility comes at 
this price. We have not finished paying for it. I am talking about a responsibility 
that is not deaf to the injunction of thought. 
The concept and experience of responsibility that Derrida speaks of here 
have complex relations to questions of animality, time, memory, ethics, law 
and justice. Derrida is emphasising the responsibility and importance of 
thought; of "ceaselessly analysing the whole conceptual machinery, and its 
interestedness, which has allowed us to speak of the 'subject' up to now".57 I 
read Derrida as emphasising that we need to "take responsibility" for the 
historical trajectory of the subject in all its complexity, for the violence 
embedded in its historicity, by critically engaging with the borders of the 
rupture between "this 'I-we' and what we call animals",58 between the 
(anthropo-centric) Subject and those beings excluded from being Subject. 
Derrida59 reminds us that the heterogeneous border of this rupture has a 
complex history, that "one can speak here of history, of a historic moment or 
phase, only from one of the supposed edges of the said rupture, the edge of 
an anthropo-centric subjectivity that is recounted or allows a history to be 
recounted about it, autobiographically…". I have previously illustrated that the 
borders that institute the subject are unstable and argued that our ethical duty 
towards other animals demands that we position and include the critical 
project located at these borders in relation to concepts of time, memory and 
justice.60 A genealogical reflection on the creation and reproduction of these 
borders not only exposes the inexactness of its constitutive functioning, but 
also sheds light on the hegemony of the trajectory of subjectivity and the 
violent spaces that various Others occupy (with)in the subjectile of the rupture 
and across the divide.  
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Derrida's concept of carno-phallogocentrism that I previously discussed61 
underlines and further complicates the violence embedded in the partitions 
that institute the anthropo-centric Subject and highlights another problematic 
of a superimposed shared subjectivity between humans and animals. I have 
been arguing that the Subject has been constructed on an underlying 
foundation of man's non-identity with juxtaposed Others, particularly women 
and animals. There is, however, also a constitutive scheme of ingestion that 
underlies the relation between subjectivity and the animal's body. Derrida's 
neologism "carno-phallogocentrism" captures this ingestion of the Other that 
is intrinsic to the founding and solidification of humanistic subjectivity and 
emphasises that this operation is both symbolic and real when the body or 
corpse of the animal is concerned: 
I would want to explain carno-phallogocentrism, even if it comes down to some 
sort of tautology or rather hetero-tautology as a priori synthesis, which you could 
translate as 'speculative idealism,' 'becoming-subject of substance,' 'absolute 
knowledge' passing through the 'speculative Good Friday': it suffices to take 
seriously the idealizing interiorisation of the phallus and the necessity of its 
passage through the mouth, whether it's a matter of words or of things, of 
sentences, of daily bread or wine, of the tongue, the lips, or the breast of the 
other.62 
Carnophallogocentrism identifies the intentional subject (and the discourse 
from which he emanates) with constitutive requisites of carnivorism, 
masculinity and rationality. My concern is with the violence that cultivates and 
nourishes the borders of these requisites, both in its symbolic form of "words 
or sentences" and its materialising expression in the consumption of the 
"breast of the other". The point at issue is that the actual consumption of the 
animal is essential to the constitution of subjectivity, "the subject does not 
want just to master and possess nature actively. In our cultures, he accepts 
sacrifice and eats flesh".63 Man's becoming-subject derives from historical 
and continuing violence that extends far beyond the privative space that the 
animal occupies at the border of the human (subject) / animal (object) rupture. 
The structure of subjectivity feeds on the animal's flesh. The metaphysics of 
subjectivity is thus not only a conceptual violence that facilitates and 
legitimates our continued oppression of the animal Other, but it is 
fundamentally antithetical to her interests. By attempting to strategically 
tweak the boundaries and simply add animals into the legal construct of 
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subjectivity in its given state we are not challenging the status quo, but rather 
solidifying and extending the legitimacy of a discourse and mode of social 
regulation that is fundamentally anthropocentric. My argument is that these 
theorists and activists are simply re-constructing the classical humanist 
subject of metaphysics and re-establishing the subject-centered system that 
silences the call of the animal Other. We can only address, incapacitate and 
move beyond this scheme of power through a rigorous deconstruction of the 
partitions that institute the Subject and "a reinterpretation of the whole 
apparatus of limits within which a history and a culture have been able to 
confine their criteriology".64 
It is pertinent at this point to briefly revisit and highlight the ethical significance 
and positioning of my deconstructive project, specifically in relation to the 
larger themes of law and responsibility. My previous engagement with 
Cornell's ethical reading and renaming of deconstruction illustrates how 
deconstruction seen as a philosophy of limit intimates the quasi-
transcendental conditions constituting any system as a system and in turn 
exposes the inevitability of a "beyond" to a system, that which the system 
inescapably excludes.65 Cornell's project allows us to better understand the 
philosophical concept of deconstruction and her (re)conceptualisation 
clarifies the responsibility that deconstruction calls for in relation to a legal 
system. This responsibility, which Cornell66 perhaps more accurately 
designates as a locus of accountability, relates to our memories and the 
future that we promote in the act of remembrance. Derrida67 repeatedly 
accentuates the historical and interpretative memory fundamental to 
deconstruction, reminding us that "this is not only a philologico-etymological 
task or the historian's task but the responsibility in face of a heritage that is at 
the same time the heritage of an imperative or of a sheaf of injunctions". 
Genealogy, then, forms part of judicial integrity and the critical observer holds 
the tradition or system to task through the remembrance of its exclusions and 
partialities.68 Cornell recalls the history in which women were denied 
autonomy over their own bodies and, in a similar vein, I am here educing the 
violent sacrificial relation between subjectivity and animality. The structure of 
subjectivity (re)presents a very real limit to the striving for justice, specifically 
in its perpetuation of an anthropocentric order. Any striving for justice 
demands that we expose the limits of what has come to be instituted as law 
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through the preservation of the legal system.69 To quote Derrida:70  
This responsibility before memory is a responsibility before the very concept of 
responsibility that regulates the justice and appropriateness [justesse] of our 
behavior, of our theoretical, practical, ethicopolitical decisions. This concept of 
responsibility is inseparable from a whole network of connected concepts 
(propriety and property, intentionality, will, freedom, conscience, 
consciousness, self-consciousness, subject, self, person, community, decision, 
and so forth). All deconstruction of this network of concepts in their given or 
dominant state may seem like a move toward irresponsibility at the very moment 
that, on the contrary, deconstruction calls for an increase in responsibility.  
Deconstruction reconceived as the philosophy of the limit helps us to better 
understand justice as the limit to a system of positive law and the attendant 
increase in responsibility, precisely because it underlines the ethical 
aspiration behind the exposure of the system's limit and Other. Cornell's 
reading of deconstruction is grounded in profound insight into the limitrophe 
nature of deconstruction and the significance of the way in which 
deconstruction exposes the limit of a system or concept. The limit cannot be 
positively described as an oppositional cut or self-limitation and thereby 
reduced to a dichotomy or excess that can be incorporated into the system. 
The work of deconstruction is not to efface a limit, but rather to complicate 
the limit(s). Cornell's reading of deconstruction forcefully resonates in 
Derrida's71 later claim in relation to the question of the animal, that "limitrophy 
is therefore [his] subject. Not just because it will concern what sprouts or 
grows at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what 
feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and complicates it". It is within the 
complexity of limitrophy that deconstruction exposes why and how the Other 
is other to the system and this exposure, as Cornell reminds us, is driven by 
an ethical aspiration to observe the call of the Other. 
The single oppositional man (subject) / animal (object) limit has not only 
functioned to solidify anthropocentric hegemony, but has eradicated the 
plethora of existences and relational structures on both sides of the rupture. 
Beyond the partitions that construct the human lies "a heterogeneous 
multiplicity of the living", complex relations of organisation that are 
increasingly difficult to dimidiate.72 These relations resist simple dissociation, 
reductive categorisation and homogenisation, rendering the conflation of the 
singular animal Other to a generalised occasion of "the Animal" problematic 
on several levels. On an ethical level, reliance on these metaphysical 
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categories embodies inherent violence to otherness. Recalling Cornell's73 
description of the ethical relation as "the aspiration to a nonviolent 
relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes 
responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny 
her difference and singularity", we can see how homogenisation and 
appropriation of "the animal" (or animal in general) betrays the most 
fundamental characteristic of the ethical relation. As I have also previously 
argued, subjectivity as building block for rights inherently relies on reductive 
disengagements that privilege similarity over difference and grounds ethical 
responsibility in likeness.74 The need for a thinking of différance rather than 
opposition is once again emphasised.  
On an ontological level, the violent functioning of the metaphysical human / 
animal dualism necessitates a new non-anthropocentric perspective of 
singularity that resists reductive and privative accounts of being(s) and strives 
to embrace animals on their own terms. The genesis of such an alternative 
thought is, as I have already suggested, located at the border of the human / 
animal limit and will succeed a rigorous deconstruction of the functioning of 
the limit and its relation to different concepts and practices. I use the word 
genesis deliberately as the philosophy of the limit is not simply a disruptive 
and destabilising exercise that leaves us stranded before an exposed 
obstruction, but provides us with a space of origin and a mode of formation. 
It confronts us with an occasion and, more importantly, the responsibility to 
think (again). "There is a duty in deconstruction", reminds Derrida.75 "There 
has to be, if there is such a thing as duty. The subject, if subject there must 
be, is to come after this".76 The deconstruction of metaphysics thus opens up 
a space for a de novo determination of the "subject"77 that proceeds from 
different sites of interruption. There is indeed life following the displacement 
and decentring of the classical metaphysical subject and the question 
concerning the "who" inevitably remains.  
5 The post-deconstructive "who" 
In the same interview with Nancy, Derrida makes the following two intriguing 
statements towards a possible new determination or location of the who-
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"subject":  
There is another possibility that interests me more at this point: it overwhelms 
the question [who comes after the subject] itself, re-inscribes it in the experience 
of an 'affirmation,' of a 'yes' or of an 'en-gage' … that 'yes, yes' that answers 
before even being able to formulate a question, that is responsible without 
autonomy, before and in view of all possible autonomy of the who-subject, etc.78 
To be brief, I would say that it is in the relation to the 'yes' or to the Zusage 
presupposed in every question that one must seek a new (postdeconstructive) 
determination of the responsibility of the 'subject.'79 
Derrida's reference to the Zusage stems from his critical reading of Heidegger 
in Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question,80 in which he inter alia takes 
Heidegger to task for his privative account of the animal's relation to "world", 
as discussed above. Regarding the Zusage (promise or pledge), however, 
Derrida's aim is to locate a dimension of responsibility in language. Even 
though a comprehensive discussion of this text falls beyond the scope of this 
article, a brief explanation is needed to contextualise the succeeding 
discussion and conclusions. For Heidegger, it is clear that language has 
already been granted before any question is put to language. All questioning 
compels the preceding Zusage (pledge) of that which is being put to language 
and he therefore finds the primary datum of language in das Hören der 
Zusage (listening to the pledge of language) rather than the experience of 
questioning. Derrida emphasises that Heidegger thus understands the 
Zusage as a moment of affirmation, a "yes".81 The question is necessarily 
already a response to and a responsibility for that which is prior to the 
question and consequently "one might say that the origin of language is 
responsibility".82 
Readers who are familiar with the work of Emmanuel Levinas will likely detect 
a loud echo of Levinasian ethics in Derrida's words. Levinas' project of 
displacing the humanist subject of classical metaphysics is already taken up 
in his first major work in which he critiques the Western philosophical 
tradition's striving for totalisation. Here Levinas83 focusses on the Other, 
whose "face" interrupts from a dimension of irreducible "infinity" that 
interrupts the "totality" of the subject's reductive existence and in doing so 
gives rise to the subject's inescapable ethical responsibility for the Other. The 
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face does not present itself in the form of evidence to be seen. It breaks with 
the sensible by soliciting a relationship that resists expression in terms of 
knowledge. The alterity of the Other, which is not her individual difference but 
an unencompassable transcendence, remains outside comprehension. Yet 
despite resisting conceptualisation the face is vulnerable and against its 
limitless consequences expresses the commandment "Though shalt not kill". 
To the extent that my subjectivity is founded in and as a response to the 
Other's ungraspable infinity, Levinasian ethics is the experience of a call to 
responsibility. An attempt to comprehend and conceptualise the Being of the 
Other is a negation of her alterity and a rejection of this call. The Other's 
incomprehensible character resists relations of comprehension and 
synchronisation to the self and any thought of the Other thus carries within 
itself an excess that inevitably escapes me; "the infinite is the radically, 
absolutely, other" and "in thinking infinity the I from the first thinks more than 
it thinks".84 Levinas accordingly rejects ontology as a totalising violence that 
strips the Other of her radical otherness. 
It is Levinas' second seminal work, however, which presents a defence of 
subjectivity that is written from the context of a poststructuralist critique, that 
bears a closer relation to Derrida's determination of the who-"subject". 
Indeed, there are scholars85 who conjecture that this work can be seen as a 
re-reading (of his first major work) that responds to Derrida's critique in 
"Violence and Metaphysics".86 Derrida's critique here, in short, concerns 
Levinas' ineluctable reliance on the language of ontology whilst attempting to 
move beyond metaphysics. Whereas the point of exteriority that Levinas 
locates in the face of the Other is initially articulated within the constraints of 
ontological language, the title of Levinas' second major work, "Otherwise than 
Being, or, Beyond Essence", presents a dual transformative translation of the 
Platonic Good beyond Being and explicitly identifies the intention of his 
project to overcome ontology. Here Levinas portrays the radical passivity of 
subjectivity and primordial exposure to the Other through a distinction 
between the saying (le Dire) and the said (le Dit).  
For Levinas, there are two dimensions of language. There is a saying or 
foreword that precedes language before silence is broken by verbal (or 
written) signs in the said. "Language does not begin with the signs that one 
gives, with words. Language is above all the fact of being addressed."87 The 
(ethical) saying is therefore a pre-condition of the (ontological) said and I am 
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already exposed, addressed and dedicated to the Other before I direct myself 
toward her. For Levinas,88 "the responsibility for another is precisely a saying 
prior to anything said." Very importantly, this being-for-the-Other does not 
stem from my decision, agreement or autonomy; my responsibility was 
already there before I discovered it and I am more radically constituted by 
this unique, infinite response-ability than my autonomy. This infinite 
responsibility is furthermore inescapable; whilst I may decide not to answer 
the Other's call that originates responsibility, I cannot silence her. I am 
hostage to the Other and her interruption derives from a past removed from 
my consciousness and will, "the core of human subjectivity is the extreme 
passivity of someone who always comes too late to accept his task and 
autonomy."89 
There is clear consonance between Levinas' interpretation of subjectivity as 
responsibility and Derrida's location of the who-"subject" in the "'yes, yes' that 
answers before even being able to formulate a question". There is, however, 
also critical dissonance between the two thinkers on the very question of 
responsibility, specifically regarding the limits of responsibility. Derrida holds 
that Levinasian ethics, despite displacing the self-present ego at the core of 
traditional humanism, ultimately remains tributary of metaphysical humanism 
in its reliance on anthropocentric metaphysical oppositional limits and carno-
phallogocentristic in its sacrificial structure. The Levinasian discourse that a 
priori institutes the Other as man is firmly grounded in (unquestioned) 
metaphysical distinctions that guide an anthropocentric determination of 
animal Being in relation to the human. In remaining uncritically beholden to 
the dogmatic metaphysical axiom that allows for "a noncriminal putting to 
death"90 of other animals, Levinas fails to "sacrifice sacrifice"91 and remains 
bound to the metaphysics of subjectivity that he seeks to displace.  
This dogmatic anthropocentrism of Levinas' thought betrays an internal 
contradiction that he is never able to resolve. When directly provoked with 
the question of animality, specifically regarding the possibility of the "Thou 
shalt not kill" commandment being expressed in the face of the animal, 
Levinas92 (rather surprisingly and confusingly) grants that the animal does 
indeed have a face and goes on to say that "without considering animals as 
human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings". These statements are 
surprising considering the anthropocentrism that emblematises his body of 
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work and become increasingly confusing in the light of his ensuing remarks. 
When asked about the distinctiveness of the human face and the origin of our 
obligations (if any) towards animals, Levinas makes the following assertions:  
One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face that one 
understands, for example, a dog. Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, 
but in the human face. We understand the animal, the face of an animal, in 
accordance with Dasein. The phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form 
in the dog.93  
We do not want to make an animal suffer needlessly and so on. But the 
prototype of this is human ethics. Vegetarianism, for example, arises from the 
transference to animals of the idea of suffering. The animal suffers. It is because 
we, as human, know what suffering is that we can have this obligation.94 
Levinas' privileging of the human is not only problematic in its unwillingness 
to "sacrifice sacrifice", but also discordant with his defence of subjectivity as 
the direct response(ability) to a call preceding my consciousness and any 
form of conceptualisation that would foreshadow the "transference" of an 
"idea" in the said. The problematic of the animal and the ethical in Levinas'95 
thought is further complicated when he states that "a more specific analysis 
is needed" before he can say whether a snake has a face, as if the Other is 
not wholly other and the face does not express an infinity that resists any 
appropriation within cognition. Ultimately it is clear that Levinas never 
rigorously considers the question of animal Being and the provocation to 
reflect on the place of animals in his work unearths the deeply entrenched 
metaphysical anthropocentrism that is dogmatically reasserted. The animal 
is not afforded the alterity that would place her in an asymmetrical relation to 
the self, her Being is deduced privatively in plurality against the measure of 
the human. It is this anthropocentrism to which Derrida has been very 
observant that leads him to claim that Levinas' thinking, like that of Heidegger, 
remains profoundly humanistic. I want to suggest, however, that Derrida's 
deconstruction of Levinas can itself be read ethically; as an intervention that 
directs us to the centre of the subject and aims to guard against the failure to 
protect the Other's otherness that Levinas' concept of the ethical relation is 
so attentive of.96 
To this end, Derrida97 is most notably at pains to problematise the 
oppositional human / animal binary embedded in Western philosophical 
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discourse inter alia by situating a responsibility that is irreducible to the 
traditional construct of the Subject, precisely by demonstrating how his 
disruptive motifs (différance, trace, iterability, ex-appropriation, etc.) "are at 
work everywhere, which is to say, well beyond humanity". Again, Derrida 
does not simply uncritically expand the Levinasian ethical to include other 
animals, but provides a framework to think through and overcome the 
anthropocentric milieu shaped by dominant discourses. Who, then, is the 
"who" in Derrida's texts and by what right, if any, should we employ this 
translation?  
6 Towards a non-anthropocentric refiguration 
The "who" is most importantly a singularity (rather than an individuality or 
atom identical to itself) "that dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself 
together to answer to the other, whose call somehow precedes its own 
identification with itself."98 This "who" is en-gaged in responsibility prior to 
self-presence and autonomy; overwhelmed by the trace, différance, ex-
appropriation and signature in the affirmation of having already answered to 
the "yes, yes" in (in)capacity of irreplaceable singularity. The question 
emanating from this analytic of singularity concerns the appropriateness of 
its translation into a "who", a question that is particularly complex in its 
chronological, philosophical and grammatical topology. In continuing to 
address this issue, I would like to suggest that the question of "Who?" cannot 
and should not be separated from the deconstruction of the Subject, as if 
deconstruction is a singular, linear event unaffected and unrelated to the 
trace. We should thus guide our intervention into the problematic of the 
Subject by asking to what extent the question "Who?" displaces or conversely 
re-introduces the structure of the classical Subject.  
Derrida's concern is that this thought of singularity might resist translation into 
the grammatical form "who", because the latter postulates inadequately 
examined conceptual oppositions that are fundamentally contributory to the 
very problem at hand and necessitate renewed and ceaseless deconstruction 
by and of themselves. Any post-deconstructive determination of the "Subject" 
should guard against positing itself in a way that is naively pre-deconstructive 
in the reconstitution of "an illegitimately delimited identity… in the name of a 
particular kind of rights".99 Deconstruction, rather, "lets itself be called by a 
more exacting articulation of rights" that, in a different way, prescribes more 
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responsibility.100 The duty in deconstruction that Derrida speaks of presents 
itself in the form of responsibility to think again; to think radically new 
discourses and determinations of "subjectivity" that destabilise the 
problematic of the Subject from a context that it no longer controls at its 
centre. This might very well require that we "forget" the unforgettable word 
("Subject") by no longer speaking of it, but rather writing it, "writ[ing] 'on' it as 
on the 'subjectile,' for example".101 This need arises because the discourse 
on the Subject inevitably remains expressive of its constitutive 
presuppositions and is destined to link subjectivity with the human, even if it 
predicates the disruptive force of différance, trace, inadequation etc. A further 
problematic inherent to the determination of the "who" as Subject relates to 
the call of the Other which, in order to remain singular and other, must remain 
un-appropriated and un-subjected. We are faced with this challenge to 
thought precisely because the responsibility to protect the otherness of the 
Other is, as Derrida102 repeatedly reminds us, not simply a theoretical 
directive. 
The problematic of the Subject is pronounced in its translation into law and 
remains marked by all the constraints that I have recalled. In order to put 
forward the interests of animals in the legal paradigm, scholars have to 
communicate and structure their reasoning and claims in keeping with the 
categories provided by the legal system. Within the subject-centered model 
of law, the result is that animal rights theorists are ultimately forced to 
establish rights for animals as Subjects by assimilating a human-like 
subjectivity, thereby (re)producing a different form of anthropocentric 
subjectivism that simply re-establishes the borders of ethical and legal 
consideration at an(other) equally problematic annexation whilst naively 
reinforcing the anthropocentric structure they seek to destabilise and 
eradicate. This approach of promoting a future of animal liberation by 
employing the very same hegemonic constructs that have historically 
functioned to subjugate animals is tragically paradoxical. A deconstructive 
engagement with the historical functioning of animality enumerates the 
exclusionary limitations of and concomitant need for radically new 
discourses, language, politics, ethics and law. The experience of 
deconstruction exposes the limits of our existing legal frameworks and clears 
the space for a rethinking of the concept of right that can proceed without 
indebtedness to the interpretation of man that is being called into question. 
Like Derrida I do not believe in a simple "miracle of legislation" and, identifying 
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metaphysical anthropocentrism as the critical target, I am ultimately calling 
for an engagement with law at a conceptual level. It is in the "beyond" to the 
reconsideration of the history of law and right(s) that we can allow ourselves 
to see and be seen by all animals looking us in the face. 
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